Mitigating the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks in Campus Local Area Network(CLAN) by Sen, Angshu Maan & Singha, K. Anand Kumar
              ISSN 22773061 
              
1706 | P a g e                                     A u g  2 5 ,  2 0 1 3  
Mitigating the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks in Campus 
Local Area Network(CLAN) 
Angshu Maan Sen,  K. Anand Kumar Singha 
Computer Centre, Dorgakona, Assam University Silchar  
angshumaan_sen@yahoo.com 
Computer Centre, Dorgakona, Assam University Silchar  
k.anandsingha@gmail.com 
ABSTRACT 
The Campus Local Area Network (CLAN) of academic institutions interconnect computers ranging from one hundred to 
about twenty five hundred and these computers are located in academic building(s), hostel building(s), faculty quarter(s), 
students amenities centre, etc all around the campus. The students, faculty and the supporting staff members use the 
network primarily for internet usage at both personal and professional levels and secondarily for usage of the available 
services and resources. Various web based services viz: Web Services, Mail Services, DNS,  and FTP services are 
generally made available in the campus LAN. Apart from these services various intranet based services are also made 
available for the users of the LAN.  
Campus LAN users from the hostels change very frequently and also sometime become targets (we call as soft targets) to 
the attackers or zombie because of either inadequate knowledge to protect their own computer/ laptop, which is also a 
legitimate node of the campus LAN;  or their enthusiastic nature of experimentation.  The interconnectivity of these 
legitimates nodes of the campus LAN and that of the attackers in the World Wide Web, make the computers connected in 
the LAN (nodes) an easy target for malicious users who attempt to exhaust the resources by launching Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks. In this paper we present a technique to mitigate the distributed denial of service attacks in 
campus wide LAN by limiting the bandwidth of the affected computers (soft targets) of the virtual LAN from a unified threat 
management (UTM) firewall. The technique is supported with help of bandwidth utilization report of the campus LAN with 
and without implementation of bandwidth limiting rule; obtained from the UTM network traffic analyzer. The graphical 
analyzer report  on the utilization of the bandwidth with transmitting and receiving bits of the campus LAN after 
implementation of our bandwidth limiting rule is also given.  
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INTRODUCTION  
A campus wide local area network (LAN) is a computer network that spans in an academic campus connecting the 
academic departments located with in a relatively small area. Most of the campus wide LANs are confined to a group of 
buildings interconnected with each other through either optical fibre cable (OFC) using Fibre Distributed Data Interface 
(FDDI) Technology or unshielded twisted pair (UTP) cable located within 100 metres distance or inside the Department 
using  layer-2 manageable switches. It connects workstations and personal computers called as nodes (individual 
computer) to various servers available in a LAN and are also connected to internet through a layer-3 switch via Firewall 
(optional) for access to the internet. Each node has its own central processing unit with which it executes programs; but it 
is able to access data and devices and users share resources like files, printers, drives etc or other applications  Users 
can also use the LAN to communicate with each other, by sending email or engage in chat sessions, playing games, 
sharing resources etc. [1]. LANs are capable of transmitting data at very fast rates, as they are interconnected through 
OFC or UTP and also because the data has a short distance to cover. A large campus wide LAN can accommodate many 
thousands of computers (nodes) by dividing into logical groups with different Default Gateway in a subnet and creating 
Virtual LANs (VLAN) with Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) to avoids the broadcast storms of L2 Switch.. Sometime wireless 
LAN facility for a specific area, conference room or smart class room is created for users who can get access to resources 
available in a campus wide LAN as well as get access to the internet. 
VLANs support logical grouping of network nodes to reduce broadcast traffic and allow more control in implementing 
security policies. VLANs are implemented in the campus wide LAN to enhance security and traffic control; to ease network 
adds, moves, and changes; to contain broadcasts. It helps to enhance manageability of switched LANs [2]. With the 
migration from shared to switched LANs the term VLAN has become a common term not only within standards 
committees and engineering departments, but in many network management centers and campuses [ 3]. Generally these 
VLANs are implemented in a campus wide LAN by creating and writing rules in a network address table of layer-3 switch. 
Network managers of the campus wide LAN define VLANs based on the following characteristics: physical ports, protocol 
type, MAC address, and IP subnets. Since the primary objective of implementing VLANs is to enhance network 
manageability during the network planning and design stages, centralized VLAN management is an important 
requirement. When VLANs can be defined remotely, and managed from a central location network managers can more 
easily design their networks based on business objectives such as improved service to users, while also continuously 
monitoring VLAN performance and adjusting VLAN policies and definitions. 
However, the interconnectivity among computers in the campus LAN and that of the World Wide Web, renders the 
computers connected in the LAN (nodes) an easy target for malicious users who attempt to exhaust their resources and 
launch Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks through SYN flooding from the user end to the entire campus wide 
local area network users. In a SYN flood an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests to a target's system in an 
attempt to consume enough server resources to make the system unresponsive to legitimate traffic. A SYN flood attack 
works by not responding to the server with the expected ACK code. The malicious client can either simply not send the 
expected ACK, or by spoofing the source IP address in the SYN, causing the server to send the SYN-ACK to a falsified IP 
address - which will not send an ACK because it "knows" that it never sent a SYN [4] . 
The server will wait for the acknowledgement for some time, as simple network congestion could also be the cause of the 
missing ACK, but in an attack increasingly large numbers of half-open connections will bind resources on the server until 
no new connections can be made, resulting in a denial of service to legitimate traffic. Some systems may also malfunction 
badly or even crash if other operating system functions are starved of resources in this way. 
In this paper we present a technique to mitigate the distributed denial of service attacks in campus wide LAN by limiting 
the bandwidth of the affected VLAN  through a unified threat management firewall. We also present here the  report from 
the network traffic analyzer on the utilization of the bandwidth during the DDoS attack with the SYN flooding with 
transmitting and receiving bits and the report after implementation of our bandwidth limiting rule.  
HISTORY OF DDOS ATTACKS   
A Denial of Service attack is a malicious attempt by a single person or a group of people to cause the victim, site, or node 
to deny service to its customers. In a denial-of-service attack a legitimate users of a service is prevented from using that 
service. There are two general forms of DoS attacks: those that crash services and those that flood services. The most 
common types of DoS attack are: 
 Consumption of computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, or CPU time. 
 Disruption of configuration information, such as routing information. 
 Disruption of state information, such as unsolicited resetting of TCP sessions. 
 Disruption of physical network components, such as preventing the access to the servers. 
When the malicious attempt is derived from a single host of the network, it constitutes a Denial of Service attack. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that a lot of malicious hosts coordinate to flood the victim with an abundance of attack 
packets also termed as SYN flooding, so that the attack takes place simultaneously from multiple points. This type of 
attack is called a Distributed Denial of Service, or simply DDoS attack [5]. In DoS attacks IP address of the attacker is 
forged through spoofing so that the location of the attacker cannot easily be identified and to also to prevent filtering of the 
packets based on the source address. 
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DDoS Attack Description 
DoS attacks attempt to usurp the available resources of  the victim's campus wide network. These resources can be 
network bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data structures. To launch a DDoS attack, the attacker first 
install the malicious code into one vulnerable machine (may be one workstation, laptop or even a file server) which is 
either running no antivirus software or out-of-date antivirus software, or those that have not been updated to the latest 
signature of the antivius software.  The affected machine then first build a network of computers, also called as attack 
network comprising  in a single VLAN or in multiple VLAN. The computers in the attack network is used to produce the 
volume of traffic needed to deny services to computer users. To create this attack network, attackers discover vulnerable 
sites or hosts on the network.   
The next step for the intruder is to install new programs (known as attack tools) on the compromised hosts of the attack 
network. The hosts that are running these attack tools are known as zombies, and they can carry out any attack under the 
control of the attacker. Many zombies together form what we call an army [6 ]. 
For initial identification of the vulnerable hosts [7 ] [8 ] [ 9] the attackers use scanning techniques, such as Random 
scanning, Hit-list scanning, Topological scanning, Local subnet scanning, Permutation scanning. 
 Random scanning: In this an attacker probes IP addresses randomly from the IP address space and checks 
their vulnerability. When it finds one it installs the malicious code into the machine and the process is continued. 
 Hit-list scanning: In this an attacker already starts with a pre-collected list of a large number of potentially 
vulnerable machines.  In their effort to create their army, they begin scanning down the list in order to find more 
vulnerable machines. 
 Topological scanning: In this an attacker uses information contained on the victim machine (an already-
compromised host)  in order to find new targets. New targets are found by  looking  for URLs of the unaffected 
machines in the disk of the victim machine that it wants to infect. Then it renders these URLs targets and checks 
their vulnerability. 
 Local subnet scanning: This type of scanning acts behind a firewall in an area (the soft targets) that is 
considered to be infected by the malicious scanning program. The compromised host looks for targets in its own 
campus wide local area network. It uses the information that is hidden in the private IP addresses generally used 
to configure any campus wide LAN of an academic institution. More specifically, a single copy of the scanning 
program is running behind a firewall and tries to break into all vulnerable machines that would otherwise be 
protected by the firewall. This mechanism can be used in conjunction with other scanning mechanisms: for 
example, a compromised host can start its scans with local subnet scanning, looking for vulnerable machines in 
its local network. As soon as it has probed all local machines, it can continue the probing process by switching to 
another scanning mechanism in order to scan off-local network machines. 
 Permutation scanning: In this technique all machines share a common pseudorandom permutation list of IP 
addresses constructed using any block cipher of 32 bits with a preselected key [8].  
A campus virtual community named Myclub2.com [11] is introduced through a case study which establish, labors its 
design goals and value degree settings of network behavior, analyzes user‟s initial motivation and induced motivation. The 
work also elaborates the setting mode and the function system of incentive mechanism. Ramamoorthi et al introduces an 
anomaly detection mechanism to detect DDoS attacks using Enhanced Support Vector Machine (ESVM) with string 
kernels [12]. In this work normal user access behavior attributes is used as training samples for ESVM, which produces 
the model file. Application and Network layer DDoS attacks are also classified in the work. with ESVM. Zhijun et al 
describes two typical types of DDoS, Flood DDoS (FDDoS) and Low-rate DDoS (LDDoS) attacks [13]. Through 
experimental results it shows that FDDoS sends a large amount of traffic to the victim which is easy to be detected wher 
as LDDoS organizes a small quantity of traffic to the victim but it is difficult to detect. A scheme to counter application layer 
DDoS attack and to schedule the flash crowd during DDoS attacks is introduced [14]. In this scheme, an Access Matrix is 
defined to capture the access patterns of the legitimate clients and the normal flash crowd. 
DDoS Attack Propogation 
There are three groups of mechanisms for propagating malicious code and building attack networks [10]. These are 
Central source propagation, Back-chaining propagation, Autonomous propagation. The description along with their 
graphical representation is presented in table 1 in the following page.  
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Table 1: DDoS Attack Propagation  Type 
Type Description 
 
Graphical representation 
Central 
source 
propagat
ion: 
After the discovery of the  vulnerable victim, 
toolkit request is sent and then attack toolkit 
is transferred from a central source to the 
newly made victim. After the toolkit is 
transferred, an automatic installation of the 
attack tools takes place on this victim, 
controlled by a scripting mechanism.  
 
Back-
chaining 
propagat
ion 
The attack toolkit is transferred to the victim 
from the attacker. More specifically, the 
attack tools that are installed on the attacker 
include special methods for accepting a 
connection from the victim and sending a file 
to it that contains the attack tools. This back-
channel file copy can be supported by simple 
port listeners that copy file contents. 
 
Autonom
ous 
propagat
ion 
The attacker transfers the attack toolkit to the 
victim at the exact moment that it breaks into 
that system. This mechanism differs from the 
previously mentioned mechanisms in that the 
attack tools are planted into the compromised 
host by the attackers themselves and not by 
an external file source 
 
 
DDoS Attack Methodology 
A perpetrator in DDoS attack attempts either Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) flood or SYN flood in a campus 
LAN. In ICMP flooding Smurf attack, Ping flood, and Ping of death are tried. A smurf attack relies on misconfigured 
network devices that allow packets to be sent to all computer hosts on a particular network via the broadcast address of 
the network, rather than a specific machine. The network then serves as a smurf amplifier. In such an attack, the 
perpetrators will send large numbers of IP packets with the source address faked to appear to be the address of the 
victim. The network's bandwidth is quickly used up, preventing legitimate packets from getting through to their destination. 
Ping flood is based on sending the victim an overwhelming number of ping packets, usually using the "ping" command. It 
is very simple to launch, the primary requirement being access to greater bandwidth than the victim. Ping of death is 
based on sending the victim a malformed ping packet, which might lead to a system crash. 
A SYN flood occurs when a host sends a flood of TCP/SYN packets, often with a forged sender address. Each of these 
packets is handled like a connection request, causing the server to spawn a half-open connection, by sending back a 
TCP/SYN-ACK packet (Acknowledge), and waiting for a packet in response from the sender address (response to the 
ACK Packet). However, because the sender address is forged, the response never comes. These half-open connections 
saturate the number of available connections the server is able to make, keeping it from responding to legitimate requests 
until after the attack ends. The SYn flooding methodology is explained graphically in the figure. It is clear from the Fig 1  
that the perpetrator send series of SYN request and receives Ack without responding to the Ack-Req. and thus half open 
connections at the server side is created and thus exhaust the all the ports that the server can open for providing service. 
This prevents a legitimate user to get the service form the server. 
              ISSN 22773061 
              
1710 | P a g e                                     A u g  2 5 ,  2 0 1 3  
 
Fig 1: SYN Flooding in Campus LAN 
. 
DDoS Limiting Methodology 
The DDoS attack in a campus LAN is confirmed when there is severe flip flop between the availability and non-availability 
of internet and intranet connectivity. Generally as the campus LAN is heavily used by it‟s users, a support maintenanece 
team is deployed to provide support and administer the campus LAN. In case of non-availability or any flip flop as 
mentioned above, the team is informed and a call is registered regarding the unavailability of the services. The DDoS 
attack in a campus LAN can be confirmed through the mechanism as given below: 
 Information from the users regarding non availability of services 
 Availability of PING Reply status to any URL although non-availability of the concerning web pages 
through any web browser. 
 Report of bulk consumption of the available bandwidth from the Firewall/UTM. 
 Report of changing of Dynamic global IP from Firewall/UTM. 
 Report of Increase in SYN /ICMP/UDP Flood and the drop of traffic due to this. 
In support of the above we present our university case study report with snapshot in fig 2, 3 and 4. In the Denial of Service 
(DoS) settings of the Cyberoam firewall we apply destination based "SYNC"/"UDP" flooding to check for the staus of 
flooding. 
During the troubleshooting session, we remove one by one optical Fibre Cable connected from the Core Switch to 
manageable switch at various buildings in the campus LAN physically and check the status of flooding through firewall. 
Each manageable switch is configured with different VLAN (private IPs) having different Broadcast Addresses. Adopting 
this process we observe that there was maximum flooding from the Pcs connected to one particular VLAN of the Network. 
The snapshots given at Fig 2 reports about this attack which is taken from the remote on the accessible global/WAN IP 
attached to the firewall (firewall support team from remote destination). This snapshot clearly shows that the inbound 
traffic is generated from the global/Public IPs only which is not possible /true in case of a campus LAN as  all users of the 
campus LAN are configured with private IP addresses. The snapshot further elaborates  the  “Packets Received by the 
Firewall /filter” and the “Packets dropped by the Kernel of the Firewall”. It can be seen from the figure that 881 packets 
have been captured whereas 316050 packets have been received by the filter and 301957 packets have been dropped by  
the kernel indicating  flooding of the campus LAN confirming the DDoS attack of the LAN.  The generated report is taken 
form Port A which is configured with the IP for internet usage. 
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Fig 2: Network Packet statistics collected from Firewall during DDoS attack. 
In Fig  3, we present the Port A bandwidth usage report taken from the firewall. The figure clearly shows the flooding of the 
Campus LAN with the received and the transmitted bits in Kbps causing the choke of the entire LAN bandwidth. 
 
Fig 3: Report of Consumption of bandwidth at the Port configure for accessing Internet/Intranet 
Further for confirmation of the DDoS attack of the network and for the detection of the probable victims/flooders of the 
Campus LAN we take a diagnostics view of the Cyberoam Utilities of Address Resolution Protocol(ARP). The generated 
report is placed in fig 4. 
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Fig 4: Report of ARP collected from firewall 
Limiting DDoS 
To mitigate the affect of DDoS attack we apply the bandwidth limiting methodology by creating a separate rule for the 
affected VLAN. The Screen Shot of the Quality of Service (QoS) Policy after application of the limiting rule is presented at 
fig 5. We call the limiting rule as “qos_bandwidth”, which is policy based firewall rule” defined in figure 5. The QoS policy 
type is Committed and implemented on Individual Upload/ Download having different priorities from „0‟ to „7‟; „0‟ means the 
highest priority (applicable for VOIP, etc) and „7‟ means the lowest priority (applicable for P2P, etc). We apply the 
bandwidth limiting rule in the upload and download to 1024 Kb and 2048 Kb so that the flooding by the affected victims of 
the identified VLAN does not consume the entire bandwidth of the campus LAN.  
 
Fig 5: Application of QOS policy on the DDoS Victims . 
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In fig  6 , we present the Port A bandwidth usage report taken from the firewall after applying the rule in the 
firewall with QoS as “qos_bandwidth” policy. The figure clearly shows the flooding of the Campus LAN is restricted and the 
received and the transmitted bits which was causing the choke of LAN bandwidth is removed. The Snapshots given at Fig 
7  clearly shows the inbound traffic generated from the Private  IPs only which is true/ideal in case of a campus LAN as  all 
users of the campus are configured with private IP address. The snapshot further elaborates  the  “Packets Received by 
the Firewall /filter” and the “Packets dropped by the Kernel of the Firewall”. It can be seen from the figure that zero packets 
have been dropped by  the kernel.  
 
Fig 6: Limiting the DDoS attack trough QOS(Bandwidth) limiting rule from firewall. 
 
Fig 7: Network Packet statistics after application of the qos_bandwidth policy from Firewall. 
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